

# Fuelling cars of the future : energy and environment issues

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# Policy questions

- EU wants carbon free urban transport – as this is part of its ambition to reduce carbon emissions strongly and as it wants to reduce its dependence on imported fuels
  - does this make sense?
  - Should we promote electric cars? Why?
  - Do we need to promote trams/metro versus bus and cars?

# Outline of this lecture

- Present and expected use of energy for transport
  - Expected world wide car market developments
- Climate policy objectives in international perspective
- Implications for energy policy objectives in transport

# Main conclusions


- Reducing oil use in the transport sector in the EU is not a priority
  - As its effects on net carbon emissions may be 0
  - If it saves carbon emissions it does this at a very high cost
- More sensible policies in the transport sector
  - Discourage diesel use
  - Promote cheap fuel saving technologies

# Outline of this lecture


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# Half of all oil consumptions is used for transportation


Demand by sector



Five year increments




# Developments in vehicle ownership and transport demand




# Use of fuels for transport

slowing down and slow substitution by gas (trucks, ships) and electricity (cars)

### Transport demand by fuel




### Five year increments by fuel






# Car fleet composition developments

## Fuel economy of new cars



## Vehicle sales by type



\*New European Driving Cycle

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# Origin of Climate change process

1. Human behaviour is at origin of extra GHG emissions
    - Mainly under form of CO<sub>2</sub> (75% of problem) but also methane, NO, HFC's count.
  2. GHG accumulate in atmosphere (delays)
  3. The increased concentration traps heat and generates global warming (decay 0.5% / year)
  4. Global warming generates climate change (delay 30-50 years)
  5. Climate change generates damage
- All these relations are uncertain and we can only learn only slowly

# Emissions by income and source (IPCC-WGIII AR5 - 2014)





Figure TS.3. Allocation of GHG emissions across sectors and country income groups. Panel a: Share

# Emissions per capita

Tonnes CO<sub>2</sub>



# Stabilisation of CO2 emissions?

- What reduction is required:
  - Stock pollutant (decay of 0.5%), so one needs strong decrease to reach an objective in 2050
  - Reduction of 30% in 2050
- Where are emissions coming from ?
  - Mainly energy use (2/3), deforestation (20%)
- As economy in 2050 may be 3 x as large as now, emissions per unit of output have to be reduced by 80 to 85%

# NEED FOR STRONG EMISSION REDUCTION IN THE WORLD




FIGURE 2. BAU AND STABILIZATION TRAJECTORIES FOR 450–550PPM CO<sub>2</sub>e

Source: Stern Review, Figure 8.4 (Stern 2007, 233).

# TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

- All carbon emissions mix in the atmosphere and affect the whole world for next 200 years
  - urgent action is needed
  - But how deep is still debated
- BUT
  - you can not exclude countries from the benefits of climate policy of the others
  - It is difficult to force countries to respect the international climate agreements they sign



# Simplest model for Economics of international agreements 1

- **International Agreement needs to be " Self Enforcing"**
  - Each country signing is as well off as a non signing country
  - A signing country maximizes the total welfare of the members of the group joining the agreement
- **Result:** only very few countries will sign an agreement and do more than caring about their own climate damage
- Typically: countries balance their costs of emission reduction with the climate damage they avoid for themselves

# Graphical illustration

\$/ton

10 MB

Total abatement effort  
Nash equilibrium:  $1 \times 10 = 10$   
Intern Agreement  $3 \times 3 + 7 = 16$   
Full cooperation (FB) =  $10 \times 10 = 100$   
(FB is better for everyone but you can not enforce the contract)

**Full Cooperation**

Marg Abatement Cost

**Int agreement**

3MB

Marg Benefit

**nash**

1


1

3

10

abatement

18



# Simplest model for Economics of international agreements 2

- Typically: countries balance their costs of emission reduction with the climate damage they avoid for themselves
  - This means 10 to 15% of what is needed will be realized: this is the difference between  $MAC=MB$  for each country and  $MAC=\sum MB$
  - Empirical evidence? Since start of Kyoto (1997-2012) one never reached an international agreement with all Western countries
  - Expectation: Kyoto's successor (Paris, Dec 2015) is likely to fail
  - the EU provisional commitment (goes for 40% reduction in 2030) will become less ambitious

# EU as climate policy forerunner

- EU policy justification?
  - Feels responsible for world damages of its emissions
  - Cooperative attitude: i make efforts if the others follow
  - Show the rest of the world it is not costly to realize deep cuts?
- But what can the EU really do and is it cost-effective?
  - Check effects on energy markets

# Reactions of energy markets to unilateral EU climate policy

- Distinguish between
  - fossil fuels without rents (coal, non conventional oil and gas)
  - fossil fuels (oil, gas) with large rent element in price
- If EU reduces conventional oil use
  - it will ONLY DELAY emissions NOT REDUCE emissions (“green paradox”)

# How do profit maximizing owners of oil reserves determine their production?

every owner of a resource  $Q$  will, under perfect competition, choose  $q_t$   $t=0, \dots, \infty$ , such that:

$$\text{Max} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{(p_t - c)}{(1+i)^t} q_t$$

subject to  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t \leq Q$

$$\Rightarrow (p_t - c) = (1+i)(p_{t-1} - c)$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} q_t^* = Q$$

# Equilibrium profile of prices and production of exhaustible resource

- 3 properties:
  - Margin ( $p-c$ ) increases with factor  $(1+i)$  over time
  - Resource is fully used
  - Price in latest period = choke price or max willingness to pay

# Graphical model




Figure 2.5 Optimal use of a scarce resource



PRICE of Fossil Energy

unilateral commitment of EU to reduce use of oil: Prices move from profile 1 to profile 2

$p^*$  Choke Price


$c$

1



2


$T_{25}^{\circ}$   
TIME



# Reactions of energy markets to unilateral EU climate policy

- If EU reduces conventional oil use
  - it will ONLY DELAY emissions NOT REDUCE emissions (“green paradox”)
- If EU invests successfully in R&D for cheaper carbon free substitute for oil (car running on “water” in 2050)
  - it will INCREASE current emissions and advance exhaustion

# PRICE of Fossil Energy: effect of breakthrough in vehicle technology



# Provisional wrapping up

- The chances of an effective worldwide climate agreement are small
- Unilateral reductions of oil use by a goodwilling EU are not effective: they postpone emissions rather than reduce emissions
- Better to focus unilateral reductions on coal use: a ton of coal not used, is more likely a net reduction of coal use

# Reducing oil use in transport is not cheap: it comes at a high cost

- Poorly understood by policy makers
- Two fallacies in current policy making:
  - Consumers are myopic: they underestimate the possible savings of gasoline when they buy a car
  - Gasoline is expensive

# Myopic car buyers?

- Empirical question
- There is strong empirical evidence that consumers are over the last 10 years, on average 90% efficient
  - They compare almost correctly (90%) the possible (discounted) savings of gasoline expenditures with the additional cost of a more fuel efficient car
  - Of course there are many individual consumers that make mistakes but in both directions
    - See: Grigolon L., Reynaert K., Verboven F. (2014), Consumer valuation of fuel costs and the effectiveness of tax policy: Evidence from the European car market, CES Discussion Paper 14.34

# What is the cost of gasoline?

- Consumer price (in EU) = 1.5 Euro/liter  
= 0.5 Euro/liter + 1 Euro/liter of taxes
- What is the role of the 1 Euro of taxes?
  - 0.1 Euro CO<sub>2</sub> taxes (30 Euro/ ton of CO<sub>2</sub>)
  - 0.9 Euro taxes to tax all other external costs (congestion, accidents, ...)

# What do car manufacturers and consumers do?

- They want the cheapest option for driving and are prepared to pay 1.5 Euro more for a car if it saves one more liter of gasoline
- But
  - these more fuel efficient cars are cheaper to use and will be used more (congestion, accidents etc..) and this is not what society needs



- If saving gasoline by buying more fuel efficient cars reduces emissions (remember the stock of oil)
- It will do this at high cost
  - As It saves CO<sub>2</sub> at 200 to 300 Euro/ton in the absence of other external costs (congestion, accidents, ..)
  - As it may increase driving and and increase congestion, accidents etc...
  - Things get worse when governments give subsidies for more fuel efficient cars
  - In the end saving CO<sub>2</sub> at more than 300 Euro/ton

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# What makes sense 1?

- Not fuel use in EU (20% of world) counts, so transferable technology rather than behaviour
- Rest of world (ROW) is less interested in carbon emission reduction
  - One can delay climate change more efficiently by offering ROW cheap options to reduce fuel use by cars (500 Euro/car?) rather than to go for more fancy technologies (hybrid, pure electric at 5000 Euro/car) that are mainly used in EU?

# What makes sense 2?

- Discourage diesel cars by making them pay taxes/veh km as large (or larger) than gasoline cars because diesel cars are more polluting than gasoline cars
- Diesel at 2 Euro/liter?

# Emission standards for new cars in the EU (non CO2)

## Tab. 6

EU emission limits for gasoline passenger cars (In g/km)

	Effective date*	CO	HC	NMHC	NO <sub>x</sub>	HC+NO <sub>x</sub>	PM	PN
Euro 3	Jan 2000	2.30	0.20	-	0.15	-	-	-
Euro 4	Jan 2005	1.00	0.10	-	0.08	-	-	-
Euro 5	Sep 2009	1.00	0.10	0.068	0.06	-	0.0050	-
Euro 6	Sep 2014	1.00	0.10	0.068	0.06	-	0.0045	6.0x10 <sup>11</sup> **

EU emission  
for gasoline  
diesel pass  
cars

<http://www.tran>






EU emission limits for diesel passenger cars (In g/km)

	Effective date*	CO	HC	NMHC	NO <sub>x</sub>	HC+NO <sub>x</sub>	PM	PN
Euro 3	Jan 2000	0.64	-	-	0.50	0.56	0.0500	-
Euro 4	Jan 2005	0.50	-	-	0.25	0.30	0.0250	-
Euro 5	Sep 2009	0.50	-	-	0.18	0.23	0.0050	-
Euro 6	Sep 2014	0.50	-	-	0.08	0.17	0.0045	6.0x10 <sup>11</sup> **

\* For new vehicle types

# Increasing difference between test cycle and real world emissions (NO<sub>x</sub>) (compare small area (test) with big area (real))


Diesel cars: Nitrogen oxide (NO<sub>x</sub>) emissions (in g/km)



■ On-road measured value (Carslaw, 2011)/(ICCT, 2014e)  
--- Euro emission limit

# Tax advantages for Diesel, Hybrid and Electric as side effect of carbon policy in transport


Market share, diesel vehicles (In %)



**Fig. 4-1**

Passenger cars:  
Market share,  
diesel vehicles by  
Member State

Market share, hybrid-electric vehicles (In %)



**Fig. 4-2**

Passenger cars:  
Market share,  
hybrid-electric  
vehicles (incl.  
PHEV) by Member  
State

# Leuven: subsidised e-parking, insufficient parking for bikes





# What policies make sense 3?

- Develop cheap, transferable technologies..
- Discourage diesel cars by making them pay taxes/veh km as large (or larger) than gasoline cars
- Making Electric cars pay the same excise taxes per vehicle km as gasoline cars
- Continue research on cleaner (conventional pollution) vehicles
- Substitute large part of fuel taxes by electronic road pricing

Thanks for listening

and I like people who disagree...